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The Comparative Law and Economics of Pure
Economic Loss
Francesco Parisi, Vernon Valentine Palmer, and Mauro Bussani

Abstract

Law and economics shows that a key factor in determining the optimal economic
loss rule is found in the relationship between pure economic loss and social loss.
Economic loss should be compensable in torts only to the extent that it corresponds to a socially relevant loss. In this paper we undertake a comparative evaluation of the economic loss rule to verify whether modern legal systems, although
not formally adopting the economic criterion, define the exclusionary rule in light
of efficiency considerations. The comparative analysis reveals that the substantive
applications of the economic loss rule in European jurisdictions are consistent
with the predicates of economic analysis.

Francesco Parisi 1 – Vernon Palmer 2 – Mauro Bussani 3
THE COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF PURE ECONOMIC LOSS
ABSTRACT: Law and economics shows that a key factor in determining the optimal
economic loss rule is found in the relationship between pure economic loss and social loss.
Economic loss should be compensable in torts only to the extent that it corresponds to a
socially relevant loss. In this paper we undertake a comparative evaluation of the economic
loss rule to verify whether modern legal systems, although not formally adopting the
economic criterion, define the exclusionary rule in light of efficiency considerations. The
comparative analysis reveals that the substantive applications of the economic loss rule in
European jurisdictions are consistent with the predicates of economic analysis.

1.

Introduction

The recent comparative law studies of the pure economic loss rule
reveal a great variance across legal systems in the recognition and scope of
application of the pure economic loss rule. 4 Comparative legal scholars
have struggled to find a way to compare different legal solutions within a
consistent construct. But their efforts have often led to the conclusion that
most jurisdictions’ current application of the pure economic loss rule is
eventually the result of mere historical accidents. 5 Following the more
1 Professor of Law & Director, Law and Economics Program, George Mason University,

School of Law. E-mail: parisi@gmu.edu. We would like to thank David Lord for his
valuable editorial assistance.
2 Thomas Pickles Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. E-mail: vpalmer@law.tulane.edu.
3 Professor of Law, University of Trieste. E-mail: mauro.bussani@units.it
4 Mauro Bussani, Vernon Palmer and Francesco Parisi, Liability for Pure Financial Loss in
Europe: An Economic Restatement, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 113-162 (2003); Mauro Bussani &
Vernon Palmer (eds.), “Pure Economic Loss in Europe” (2001)
5 Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A
Reassessment, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1513 (1985); Gary T. Schwartz, The Economic Loss
Doctrine in American Tort Law: Assessing the Recent Experience, in Civil Liability for
Pure Economic Loss 103 (Efstathios K. Banakas ed. 1995); Gary T. Schwartz, American
Tort Law and the (Supposed) Economic Loss Rule, in “Pure Economic Loss in Europe”
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extensive study by Bussani, Palmer and Parisi (2003), this article revisits
the apparent contradictions brought to light by comparative legal scholars
through the lens of economic analysis.
Section 2 discusses the most frequently identified rationales of the
pure economic loss rule. We contrast the traditional explanations for the
exclusionary rule - barring recovery of pure economic loss - with the
economic formulation of the rule, highlighting how traditional explanations
that are not based on notions of efficiency lead to practical inconsistencies.
Section 3 applies this framework to consider the vast comparative data
collected by Bussani and Palmer (2001) in the application of the
exclusionary rule in European jurisdictions. We show that this evidence
refutes the postulates of traditional theory, but supports an economic
reformulation of the economic loss rule. Section 4 concludes suggesting
that economic reformulation of the exclusionary rule may thus serve as a
valuable benchmark in the ongoing attempts to harmonize and codify the
rule in the European context.
2.

Pure Economic Loss Rule: In Search of a Rationale

In this Section we consider the arguments usually presented in
support of an exclusionary rule, offering some critical considerations of the
traditional rationales and dogmatic explanations of this rule. 6 These
rationales are then contrasted to the economic justifications of the
exclusionary rule. In Section 3 we shall use these competing rationales to
identify the logic that appears to influence the decision-making process
across European jurisdictions.

(Mauro Bussani & Vernon Palmer eds. 2001); James R. Gordley, the Rule Against
Recovery in Negligence for Pure Economic Loss: An Historical Accident?, in Liability for
Pure Economic Loss: Frontiers of Tort Law (Mauro Bussani & Vernon Palmer eds. 2001)
6 Naturally, these arguments were developed by jurists operating in legal systems which
have recognized—or least considered and rejected—the exclusionary rule. The experience
of countries that have ignored the exclusionary rule is indeed most valuable, since it often
suggests to us counterarguments which would otherwise remain overlooked.
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2.1

Foreseeability

A common explanation of the economic loss rule relates to the
element of foreseeability of the harm. In case law, this rationale supports
limitations on the extent of compensable harm, including cases of pure
economic loss, emotional distress and loss of consortium. In this context, it
has been suggested that tort rules based on foreseeability were developed
for physical damage and are not workable outside such context. The
evolution of the economic loss rule is explained as a pragmatic
development of the law: applying the foreseeability test to cases of pure
financial loss would lead to ruinous levels of liability. 7
Two objections to the foreseeability explanation should be
considered at this point: one factual, the other theoretical.
First, the likelihood and extent of economic loss have a degree of
foreseeability that does not differ qualitatively from the foresight of other
non-economic consequences of a typical tort situation. The closure of a
public service exemplified by the Closed Motorway 8 case is clearly on
point. As a matter of foresight, congestion and traffic delays and
consequential economic loss are unavoidable and foreseeable consequences
of a closed motorway. Yet, almost all legal systems exclude the
recoverability of economic losses of truckers and other professional
travelers who suffered an economic prejudice from closure of the public
motorway.
Second, from an efficiency standpoint, the optimal level of liability
should include both foreseeable and unforeseeable consequences. To the
extent causation is established, efficiency requires that the tortfeasor face
all the consequences of his wrongful action, such that the ex ante level of
expected liability coincides with the ex ante level of expected harm. Any
departure from such a criterion of liability would not adequately provide the
7 Bruce Feldthusen, Economic Negligence 10-11 (2nd ed. Carswell 1989). The author

asserts that the “remoteness” of the damage from the initial conduct of the defendant is the
characteristic and endemic issue which distinguishes pure economic loss, as a practical
matter, from cases involving physical damage.
8 See case study n. 15 in “Pure Economic Loss in Europe” (Mauro Bussani & Vernon
Palmer eds. 2001).
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incentive to avoid the complete harm.
Both factually and theoretically, therefore, the rule cannot be
justified by an unforeseeability notion. Many accidents produce a chain of
costly economic consequences which can be statistically estimated and
causally linked to the wrongful action. As a policy matter, the presence or
absence of foreseeability is a factual and legal question that enters the
equation of liability in the ways specified by the legal system, but no a
priori distinction can (or should) be made between economic and noneconomic consequences of a tort.
2.2

Absolute versus Relative Rights

The boundaries of compensable loss in torts have been expanding.
Legal scholars have described the domain of protected interests as having
gradually expanded along the following path: (a) protection of absolute
rights; (b) protection of relative rights; and (c) protection of other
(legitimate) expectations. 9 The recovery of economic loss confronts a
dogmatic obstacle because the “unreified” economic interests often relate to
the parties’ unfulfilled contractual expectations or other expectations of
economic significance. Several Ricochet loss cases are on point. The loss to
the victim derives from the wrongful behavior of a party contractually
unrelated to the creditor which prevents a third party from fulfilling its
contractual expectation. Other cases are similarly related to the
infringement of a yet unmatured economic interest. Such cases of tortious
interference with contractual expectations and pregnant economic interests
have traditionally posed a problem in civil law systems. Economic loss
derived from the breach of a contractual expectation, in fact, does not enjoy
erga omnes protection, since the action could only be brought against the
breaching party, not against a third party that interfered with the contractual
interest.
This argument is grounded in well-established tradition, but in the
9 See, e.g., R.L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A

reinterpretation, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 925, 927-961 (1981); G. Viney, “Introduction à la
responsabilité” 6 (2nd ed. L.G.D.J. 1995); M. Bussani, “La colpa soggettiva” 99 (Cedam
1991).
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context of pure economic loss this explanation proves too much and is
ultimately bound to beg the question of why there should be no erga omnes
protection of contractual expectations. 10
The dogmatic distinction between absolute and relative rights is
relevant to the issue of pure economic loss. The basis of such classification
is found in the different range of interests that are protected by the
enforcement of those rights. In the cases of absolute rights (e.g., rights over
real assets and personal integrity), the right is over a “thing” and other
individuals’ behavior remains irrelevant as far as their activities do not
encroach the relationship between the owner of the right and the object
being owned. Conversely, in the case of relative rights, the object of the
right is an expectation over somebody else’s behavior, a positive
cooperation that is instrumental to the fulfillment and realization of the
right. For relative rights, the person whose behavior is expected (i.e., the
debtor) becomes particularly important. It is indeed a person or group that
is distinct from the generality of the other individuals. It is only from those
individuals that the given behavior can be demanded. In the case of
absolute rights, instead, the only relevant legal subject is the owner of the
right. Others’ behavior is only relevant when it encroaches or violates the
relationship between the owner of the right and the “thing.”
The interests underlying these rights are substantially different from
one another. Relative rights contain expectations from others, and are aimed
at changing the status quo.11 Through the behavior of other individuals, the
owner of the right wants to acquire something that is not yet his own. The
owner of a relative right has a mere acquisitive interest. Absolute rights, to
the contrary, encompass a different group of situations, where the owner
already enjoys a reified interest as part of his patrimony. Third parties are
(in principle) extraneous to the legal relationship between the absolute
owner of the right and his reified interest and have no affirmative duty of
cooperation. The absolute right encompasses a legal interest which is
already part of the patrimony of its owner, and it thus reflects a
10 We shall return to this question in Section 4, after having examined the economic

reformulation of the exclusionary rule.
11 Although the presence of a duty of cooperation is essential to the structure of this
relative or personal right, the nature of the duty can be either positive or negative.
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conservative interest. If any cooperation can be seen in this legal
relationship, it is a cooperation that does not expand the preexisting scope
of the right. The negative duty of abstention from interfering or encroaching
on the protected right is only preventing a diminishment or violation of the
right itself.
The civilian distinction between absolute or relative right—based
upon the nature of the underlying interests protected by the legal system—
has traditionally served as a theoretical framework providing a default
template of remedies and rules concerning the standing and scope of
protection of such rights. At the same time, the distinction has created some
artificial inertia in the adaptation of the legal system to new changing
realities.
We contend that this explanation proves too much and ultimately
begs the question of what should be the desirable protection of pure
economic interests. First, if the rationale for the exclusionary rule is that
“relative” rights (such as economic interests and contractual expectations)
should not be protected erga omnes, the explanation would suggest that all
such relative rights would remain uncompensated if violated by a third
party. This explanation contradicts the fact that the exclusionary rule is
associated with the negligence standard, but not cases of intentional breach.
12 Furthermore, all “consequential” economic losses (i.e., losses that are
related to a previous loss of the victim suffered because of the infringement
of an absolute right of the victim) are fully recoverable in all European
jurisdictions. These elements show that the exclusionary rule is not simply
the consequence of dogmatic path dependence but a reflection of other
policy concerns.
2.3

Policy Pragmatism

A third explanation of the exclusionary rule maintains that
intangible wealth is not and should not be treated on the same level as
protecting bodily integrity or even physical property. People are more
important than things, and things are more important than money. Our legal
12 All European legal systems considered in the Bussani & Palmer (2001) study permit

recovery when pure financial loss is inflicted intentionally.
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interest in liberty, bodily integrity, land, possessions, reputation, wealth,
privacy and dignity are all good interests, “but they are not equally good.”
The law protects the better interests better. And so “a legal system which is
concerned with human values would be right to give greater protection to
tangible property than to intangible wealth.”13 The exclusionary rule is then
a reflection of the lower value ascribed to our unreified wealth.
This argument rests on a silent premise: these values must be ranked
because the law cannot simultaneously protect all interests fully. 14 This
pragmatic motivation should not be dismissed as mistaken in principle, but
seems to find no clear empirical support. While the benefits of imposing
liability for wrongful behavior should be balanced against the added
administrative costs of adjudication, there is no obvious reason to believe
that protecting pure economic loss, would decrease the effective protection
of other worthier claims. 15
This proposed doctrinal rationale also flies in the face of the full
protection granted to intentionally inflicted “pure” economic loss and the
fact that all “consequential” economic losses are recoverable under national
law. These elements show the exclusionary rule is not simply the
consequence of an ordering of interests but a reflection of other policy
concerns that—for the reason that will become evident through the
economic analysis—give relevance to the intentionality of the conduct and
the existence of prior physical harm. In Section 4, we will revisit these
13 Tony Weir, A Casebook on Tort 6 (9th ed. Sweet & Maxwell 2000)
14 See also J. Spier (ed), The Limits of Liability. Keeping the Floodgates Shut (Kluwer

Law International 1996); W.H. van Boom, H. Koziol, Ch. A. Witting (eds) “Pure
Economic Loss” (Springer 2004).
15 Bussani & Palmer (2001) have pointed out that even if we accept that wealth is less
important than other values, there would still be no justification for a rule restricting its
recovery unless we had to do so in order to protect other, more meritorious interests. Thus
the philosophical point is persuasive to the extent that (1) there is indeed a finite limit to the
law’s ability to protect interests and (2) giving full protection to pure patrimonial wealth
would clearly exceed that capacity and therefore impinge on other protections.
Besides the added costs of adjudication, nothing seems to provide empirical support for the
claim that the ultimate effect might be to crowd out “better” interests and leave them
unsatisfied. Any such assumption would be at best conjectural, and raises the question how
France and Belgium, which follow a rule of presumptive recovery of economic loss, have
avoided such crowding out of more deserving legal claims..
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issues and offer an explanation of the apparent anomalies in the judicial
application of the economic loss rule.
2.4

Administrative Costs and Derivative Litigation

Common law countries, mixed jurisdictions and a number of civil
law countries all share similar concerns about the danger of excessive
liability entailed by pure economic loss claims. In this context, another
frequently invoked explanation for the exclusionary rule concerns the
problems of open-ended liability and derivative litigation, i.e., the extension
16
of liability for the remote consequences of a wrongful act.
The common premise of these arguments is that in a complex
economy, pure economic losses are likely to be serially linked to one
another. The forgone production of a good, for example, often generates
losses that affect several downstream individuals and firms who would have
utilized the good as an input in their production process, and so on. In such
world of economic networking, it becomes necessary to set reasonable
limits to the extent to which remote economic effects of a tort should be
made compensable. Open-ended liability arguments have a well-established
doctrinal lineage. 17
In spite of such a common pragmatic motivation, there are actually
16 Recent literature has pointed out that the judicial applications of the economic loss rule

have been one aspect of a general attempt to limit tort liability. Gary T. Schwartz, The
Economic Loss Doctrine in American Tort Law: Assessing the Recent Experience, in Civil
Liability for Pure Economic Loss 103 (Efstathios K. Banakas ed. 1995); Gary T. Schwartz,
American Tort Law and the (Supposed) Economic Loss Rule, in “Pure Economic Loss in
Europe” (Mauro Bussani & Vernon Palmer eds. 2001); see also B. Markesinis, An
Expanding Tort Law - The Price of a Rigid Contract Law 354, 103 Law Q. Rev. 1987; J.
Stapleton, Duty of Care Factors: A Selection from the Judicial Menus, in “The Law of
Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming”, (P. Cane and J. Stapleton eds. Oxford
University Press 1998). This goal is supported by the fact that the economic loss rule is
fundamentally at odds with the overall tendency to expand the scope of liability in other
areas of tort law (e.g., personal injury and harm to property). Such opposite tendency is
explained by the fact that expanded liability in those areas rarely yields problems of
derivative and open-ended litigation.
17 Von Ihering’s statement “Where would it all lead if everyone could be sued…!” is
indeed a famous rendition of this general concern. Jherings Jahrbücher 4, 12-13 (1861)
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three distinct strands to the open-ended liability argument.
(a) The first strand is the belief that permitting recovery of pure
economic loss in some cases (e.g., closure of trading markets or of a busy
motorway) would unleash a large number of actions that would burden, if
not overwhelm, the courts. The justice system could not cope with the sheer
numbers of claims. This point closely relates to the concern for costeffectiveness in the administration of tort law to minimize the total cost of
accidents.
(b) The second strand is the fear that widespread liability would
place an excessive burden upon the defendant who, for purposes of the
argument, is treated as the living proxy of human initiative and enterprise.
(c) The third strand of the argument is that pure economic loss is
simply part of a broad modern trend toward greater and greater tort liability,
a trend that threatens to get out of control. Allowing exceptions to the
exclusionary rule is a slippery slope that may lead to reversal of the rule and
may also encourage other types of tort liability. 18
Economic analysis calls for a different response to each of the three
open-ended liability concerns. From an economic point of view, the first
strand of open-ended liability arguments is both factually and theoretically
accurate. The justice system would unavoidably face an increase in
administrative costs as a result of the proliferation of tort claims. Tort
policy should account for such administrative costs, which ultimately affect
the total social cost of accidents.
The second strand of arguments is theoretically flawed. According
to this variation of the open-ended liability argument, the potentially
staggering liability faced by tortfeasors would be disproportionate to the
degree of the defendant’s negligence. The danger of harsh consequences
from minor blameworthiness is an issue of fairness no matter what kind of

18 The Tilburg Group, for example, argues that the floodgates must be kept shut in order
“to dam crushing liability” and to resist the general trend toward expansion of liability. See
J. Spier (ed.) The Limits of Liability (Kluwer 1996); J. Spier, The Limits of Expanding
Liability (Kluwer 1998). Six of eight hypotheticals chosen for comparative study by the
Tilburg Group deal with the subject of pure economic loss. The floodgates metaphor plays
a central role in their orientation.
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damages have been caused 19 , but some scholars believe that the danger is
far greater in pure financial loss cases. These concerns are misplaced. In
order to maintain efficient precaution incentives, parties should under most
circumstances face the full range of economic consequences of their
activities, no matter how severe the harm.
The third strand of arguments does not appear to apply particularly
to situations of pure economic loss, since they could well relate to other
kind of losses, pecuniary, non-pecuniary, or purely economic. This view
argues that the exclusionary rule should be invoked even where there is no
danger of a flood of claims or disproportionate recovery. No compensation
should be made for fear of establishing an exception that erodes the rule or
an exception that may receive analogical extension in the future.
2.5

Private versus Social Loss: The Optimal Scope of Liability

In order to understand the economic significance of the pure
economic loss rule, it is necessary to proceed in two steps: first analyzing
the notion of socially relevant economic loss, then applying that concept to
the design of optimal liability rules.
From the perspective of law and economics, tort remedies are
necessary to specify and quantify externalities. An externality is a cost
imposed on a third party outside the voluntary mechanisms of the
marketplace. In principle, tort liability should ensure that the entire social
cost of an activity is addressed by the responsible party. In this context, the
amount of “social” loss is given by the sum of all private losses imposed by
a given action on the various parties less the sum of all external benefits
generated by such conduct. According to this criterion, liability in torts
should not be exclusively linked to the private losses of the parties, but
20
should be further limited to the socially relevant harm. The application of
19 See Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in Philosophical

Foundations of Tort Law 387 (David Owen ed. 1995)
20 Applying this principle requires focusing on the tortfeasor’s expected ex ante liability,
rather than on the victim’s actual compensation. This may occasionally require courts to set
aside some other general principle of tort law. For example, the collateral-benefits rule,
which allows the victim to recover the full value of a loss without deducting insurance
payments for the same damage may be quite efficient. First, it creates efficient precaution
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this version of the exclusionary rule would contribute to the minimization
of the total cost of accidents.
Some activities, while imposing private losses on some third parties,
may create benefits for others. A legal system aiming at creating optimal
incentives for potential tortfeasors should impose a dual system of liability:
imposing positive liability for the negative externalities and recognizing
negative liability for the positive externalities. From an efficiency point of
view, the creation of a negative liability rule is as important a remedy as a
positive liability rule in a standard tort situation.
As a policy matter, several legal limitations concerning
compensable harm, including some variations of the economic loss rule,
can be explained as ways to confine liability to only socially relevant
externalities. The issue of pure economic loss is best understood contrasting
a case of pure economic loss with a traditional situation of physical harm.
Generally in cases of physical harm, the action correlates with the extent of
the private and social cost of the harm. Any loss suffered by an individual
occasions a private cost to the victim, which in turn counts as a social cost
for the community. A different logic applies in the case of pure economic
loss. In the case of foregone profits or earnings, for example, there is no
one-to-one relationship between the private loss of the victim and the
resulting social loss. To the contrary, the private loss generally exceeds the
social loss, and the discrepancy between the two values may be substantial.
This may lead to paradoxes where a private loss yields a social gain. In pure
economic loss cases, we may have situations of wrongful behavior that
occasion an economic loss for one victim but which may impose no cost, or
may even generate a net benefit, to society at large. Whenever wrongful
behavior creates a private loss, the magnitude of which differs from the
incentives on the tortfeasor. Second, in most situations, the double payment from the
insurance and the tortfeasor does not in fact amount to allowing the victim to recover
double. As pointed out by Posner (1986) and Landes & Posner (1987), the insured plaintiff
already paid for the insurance benefit under the form of insurance premium, rendering full
liability necessary to make him whole. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (3rd
ed. 1986); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law
(1987). More generally, the risk of duplicate recovery should not necessarily generate
over-deterrence, given the relevance of the ex ante expected liability, rather than actual ex
post compensation, on individual incentives.
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resulting social loss, economic analysis indicates that the victim should
only be compensated for the portion of the private loss (if any) which
represents a social cost. Where a private loss to the victim yields a net gain
to society at large, law and economics concludes that the wrongful behavior
should actually be encouraged and economically subsidized by the legal
21
system . Put differently, an ideal set of liability rules should provide both
positive liability for negative externalities (i.e., losses to third parties) and
negative liability for positive externalities (i.e., benefits to third parties).
This dual function of liability rules would, in the abstract, consist of
a combination of damage remedies paid to the victims and financial
subsidies paid to the tortfeasor. If an individual occasions an unjustified
transfer of wealth from one party to another and is made liable for the loss
suffered by one victim, he should, by the same logic, be allowed to recover
the value of the benefit from other third parties who received an unexpected
benefit from his action. The important point here is that a zero net liability
rule for the alleged tortfeasor does not necessarily require a rule denying
compensation for those who suffered a private loss. Here lies an important
element that drives the intellectual and dogmatic tension behind the
economic loss rule. From an economic perspective, the legal notion of pure
economic loss is thus an imperfect proxy for the economic category of
socially relevant cost, which should guide the optimal design of liability
rules.
3.

Back to Reality: Revisiting the Comparative Findings

The findings of the comparative study of the rules governing the
recovery of pure economic losses in European legal systems show relatively
little coherence, let alone uniformity, in the treatment of pure economic loss
cases. Table 1 summarizes data collected by Bussani and Palmer (2001)
and provides a summary of the solutions to typical pure economic loss
situations in European national Courts. These categories of loss are
21 On this point, Arlen (2000) observes that, if an incumbent monopolistic firm loses part
of its market share to a competitor selling the same product at a lower price as a result of
the tortuous activity of the latter, the alleged tort, while occasioning the victim’s lost
profits, may actually be at the origin of a social welfare gain.
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explained and analyzed in the following subsections.

Recovery
(a) Ricochet Loss
(i)

Cable
Cases

(ii)

Loss of a
“Star”

(b) Transferred
loss
(c) Closure of
Public Service
(d) Flawed
Professional
Advice
(i)
Lawyers/
Notaries
(ii)

Auditors

Unsettled

France, Belgium,
Greece, Italy,
Spain, The
Netherlands

--

No Recovery
Austria, England,
Finland, Germany,
Portugal, Scotland
Sweden
Austria, Belgium,
England, Finland,
Germany, Greece
Portugal, Sweden,
Scotland, The
Netherlands

France, Italy

Spain

Austria, Belgium,
France, Greece,
Spain, The
Netherlands

Italy

England, Finland,
Germany, Portugal,
Scotland Sweden

Italy, Greece,
The
Netherlands

Austria, Belgium,
England, Finland
Germany, Portugal,
Scotland, Spain,
Sweden

France

Austria, Belgium,
England, France,
Germany,
Greece, Italy,
Scotland, Spain,
The Netherlands

Finland,
Portugal,
Sweden

Belgium, Italy,
Sweden, Finland,
The Netherlands

France, Spain,
Greece

--

Austria, Germany,
Portugal, England,
Scotland

Table 1: Recovery of Economic Loss in European Jurisdictions

The applications of the economic loss rule summarized in Table 1
reveal that the issue of recoverability of pure financial loss cannot be
approached in terms of some distinctive trait or characteristic of the “legal
13
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families” of Western Europe. The question is not simply an issue that pits
civil law against common law. Contrary to the conclusions reached by
several legal commentators on this issue, 22 the comparative findings
however suggest that the emergence and diffusion of the economic loss rule
in European legal systems is more than a mere historical accident. We
evaluate these findings in the light of the alternative rationales presented in
Section 2 and attempt to reconcile some of the apparent contradictions of
the judicial applications of the economic loss rule.
The analysis provides a plausible explanation for the gradual
departure of all European legal systems from their default attitude towards
liability in torts: “liberal” systems, such as France, create exceptions to the
domain of compensable economic loss, and “conservative” systems grant
occasional compensation for losses that would otherwise fall outside the
listing of protected interests. In this context, economic analysis unveils the
underlying logic of what would otherwise appear to be an ad hoc
application of the exclusionary rule driven by a fuzzy judicial pragmatism.
3.1.

The Relevance of Case Law Distinctions in Ricochet Cases

In the first group of cases, the Ricochet loss cases, a physical
damage is done to the property or person of one party, which impairs the
contract rights of the plaintiff. Examples contemplate damage to things or
persons that, in turn, occasion an economic prejudice to a third party. The
direct victim of the accident sustains physical damage while plaintiff is a
secondary victim who incurs only economic harm. The “Cable Cases”23 and
the “Loss of a Star” cases, 24 are real life examples on point.
22 Gary T. Schwartz, The Economic Loss Doctrine in American Tort Law: Assessing the

Recent Experience, in Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss 103 (Efstathios K. Banakas
ed. 1995); Gary T. Schwartz, American Tort Law and the (Supposed) Economic Loss Rule,
in “Pure Economic Loss in Europe” (Mauro Bussani & Vernon Palmer eds. 2001); James
R. Gordley, the Rule Against Recovery in Negligence for Pure Economic Loss: An
Historical Accident?, in “Pure Economic Loss in Europe” (Mauro Bussani & Vernon
Palmer eds. 2001)
23 E.g., Spartan Steel and Alloys v. Martin & Co., QB 27 (1973)
24 See, e.g., the Italian case Torino Calcio SPA v. Romero, Cass. Civ., SU 26.1.1971, n.
174, GI, 1971, I,1, 681
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In Ricochet loss cases the relationship between the private loss of
the plaintiff and the resulting social loss deserves some consideration. The
European cases reflect the mixed nature of the loss in Ricochet loss cases,
as reflected by the split judicial decisions on the matter. The trends,
however, strongly support our hypothesis that the contours of the economic
loss rule are driven by implicit efficiency considerations. Indeed, European
trends in the adjudication of Ricochet cases are consistent with our
economic restatement of the rule, as shown by the fact that the very large
majority of jurisdictions deny liability in “Loss of a Star” cases, while
granting compensation in “Cable Cases.” The empirical findings are even
more striking in that “Cable Cases” present problems of open-ended
litigation that the “Loss of a Star” situations do not.
The dichotomous treatment of these two categories of Ricochet loss
is easily explained in economic terms. In many situations, an asset’s market
price already captures the discounted present value of the flow of income
from the employment of the asset in valuable productive activities. The
market for sport champions is highly competitive and players are able to
exploit their bargaining power to their advantage. The value of a soccer
player, thus, already captures most of the surplus that the team expects to
earn from the player. In the market for “stars” individual champions capture
most of the rent, given their position as monopolistic sellers of non-fungible
services. If compensation received by the victim already includes the lost
wages from his “star” employment, any additional liability of the tortfeasor
toward the team would likely amount to duplicate compensation for the
same loss, causing excessive liability and over-deterrence.
Not every Ricochet case, however, fits this mold. In the “Cable
Cases,” for instance, the asset’s market price does not capture the full
surplus that third parties derive from its use. The price of telephone
services, for example, cannot be assumed to capture the full consumer
benefit derived from the use of such services. If the exclusionary rule limits
liability to the loss suffered by the telephone company, compensation
would fall short of the true social loss occasioned by the accident.
Exclusionary rules in these cases stem from concerns for open-ended
liability and not for efficient incentive considerations. In most real life
cases, the true social loss probably lies in between the above considered
values, since neither upstream suppliers nor downstream consumers are
15
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likely to capture the full surplus. These intermediate cases would call for a
partial application of the exclusionary rule, limiting liability to the “socially
relevant” portion of the economic loss.
The observed pattern of adjudication in European jurisdictions
contradicts scholars who maintain that the emergence and popularity of the
exclusionary rule would be explained by concerns for open-ended litigation.
If such claim were correct, we would observe the opposite pattern of
adjudication in Ricochet loss cases. These findings clearly support our
hypothesis that efficiency considerations are strongly influencing results in
this category of cases.
3.2.

Normative Agnosticism for Transferred Losses

In the second group of pure economic loss situations, which we call
Transferred loss cases, a tortfeasor causes physical damage to a victim’s
property or person, but a contract, or the law itself, transfers the loss to a
third party. As a result of an initial wrongdoing, a loss that would ordinarily
fall on the primary victim alone (generally the direct victim of physical
injury or the owner of a physical asset) is passed on to a secondary victim,
who only has a contractual interest in the property or a contractual
obligation to insure the victim’s loss. A transfer of loss of this type usually
occurs when the damaged property is subject to a lease, a pending sales
contract, or an insurance agreement. 25 A similar transfer of the loss can be
effected by the law when, for example, a pay continuation statute requires
an employee to pay the salary of an employee, even if the worker is unable
to perform his obligations under the contract due to an injury occasioned by
a third party tortfeasor.
Legal systems address the question of whether the secondary victim
should be able to obtain compensation for the pure financial loss from the
tortfeasor, with openly different solutions. From an economic point of view,
the solution to these cases is quite straightforward. The relevant factor for
determining the optimal level of liability is given by the extent of the
25 E.g., Robins Dry Dock v. Flint, 13 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1926), rev’d 275 U.S. 303 (1927);

The Aliakmon, 2 AER 44 (1985)
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socially relevant loss. The transfer of a loss from a primary victim to a
secondary victim which results from a contract (e.g., a lease or an insurance
contract), while changing the final allocation of the residual liability, does
not modify the gravity of the actual loss occasioned by the accident. An
accident produces an objective loss, regardless of who ultimately bears such
loss. For example, an accident that destroys a commercial building creates a
given amount of loss, whether the building is insured or whether a statute
or a contract transfers some of the loss to a secondary victim. The optimal
amount of liability imposed on the tortfeasor should, therefore, not depend
on the existence of a loss transfer mechanism. The physical and economic
losses that follow the destruction of a building should be compensated in
full regardless of who ultimately bears the risk: an insurance company, a
tenant, or the actual property owner.
The exclusionary rule should be utilized to prevent imposition of
double liability—in favor of both primary and secondary victims—for the
same loss, but should in no way reduce the amount of the tortfeasor’s
liability below the total social loss generated by the accident. Put
differently, for the purpose of optimal deterrence, the expected liability
should equal, but not exceed, the full social loss. The computation of the
social loss in these cases should include the sum of the “net” loss received
by the property owner and the additional loss received by those who have
other interests over the property. Whether such total compensation is paid
to the primary or the secondary victim, or split among the two, is
immaterial from a deterrence standpoint. Other principles, however, come
to the rescue in establishing who should receive compensation for the loss.
From an economic point of view, the main criterion for
understanding the transferred loss problem flows from the following
consideration. Rational parties account for the effect of their expected
liability in setting the price for their contract. The clearest illustration can
be found in the insurance case. If insurance companies are allowed to
exercise a subrogation action to obtain compensation from the original
tortfeasor in all cases of Transferred loss, the average net recovery from
subrogation claims will be discounted from their expected liability cost. In
turn, this will lower the insurance premium for all potential primary
victims. The same holds in the converse case in which an exclusionary rule
prevents the secondary victim from recovering the economic loss. If any
17
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other contractual relation or legal rule transfers the loss from a primary to a
secondary victim, the underlying contract price would likewise reflect the
expected cost of such transferred risk. For example, in the event of a pay
continuation statute, the employer discounts the risk of an injury of his
workers from the expected value product of his work force. The equilibrium
market wages would reflect the mandatory welfare coverage, shifting back
on the workers most of the cost of such forced insurance. Identical
conclusions would apply under a lease contract. Consider an exclusionary
rule that states, if a third party occasions damage to the rented property, the
lessee would be barred from recovering the economic loss from the lost use
of the rented space. Under such rule, the lessee would discount from the
rent the expected economic loss from potential accidents. In the aggregate,
equilibrium market prices would reflect the lower protection and lower
expected value of the lessee’s interest, with lower rental prices.
The above considerations suggest that the application of the
exclusionary rule in Transferred loss cases is likely to have no incentive or
wealth effects. Criteria of efficiency and distributive justice are neutral to
the question whether the exclusionary rule should apply to this class of
cases.
The economic criterion remains agnostic on which rule should be
applied under the circumstances, but calls for clarity and coherence in the
legal system. Assuming that the likelihood that a third party inflicts damage
to the property is causally exogenous (i.e., it does not depend on the
behavior of the victim), all possible allocations of the risk are efficient, as
long as they are known by the parties and consistently applied. The legal
system, in other words, by announcing the rule ex ante provides a valuable
coordination device, which facilitates parties’ bargaining. As long as the
full social cost of the accident is borne by the tortfeasor, the exclusionary
rule will have no impact on the efficient precautions of the parties or the
final distribution of the cost of accidents. The price system will, in fact,
offset any attempt by the legal system to transfer the exogenous risk of
accidents between a primary and a secondary victim.
The conclusions generated by the efficiency criterion are thus easily
reconcilable with the observed split among European legal systems in the
treatment of Transferred loss cases. All the solutions we have examined are
in fact acceptable, as long as (1) the avoidance of the exclusionary rule does
18
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not lead to a duplication of the tortfeasor’s liability for the same objective
loss; and (2) adoption of the exclusionary rule does not exclude the full
compensation of the relevant social loss. The identification of the party who
should ultimately be entitled to collect compensation is of no consequence
for the purpose of determining efficient liability and fair risk allocation.
3.3.

Private versus Social Loss for the Closure of Public Service and
Infrastructures

In the third group of cases, an economic loss arises without a
previous injury to anyone’s property or person. Any physical damage is to
“unowned resources” that lie in the public domain. 26 Examples of this
category of cases include the scenario where a negligent act forces the
closure of a public market or a highway, occasioning an economic loss to
individuals whose production depends on such infrastructures. 27
As we have pointed out above, this category raises the greatest
concern about liability to an indeterminate class of individuals, with
relevant concerns for open-ended liability and litigation. Not surprisingly,
with the possible exception of France and a few unsettled jurisdictions,
European courts have been reluctant to grant compensation for pure
economic loss in these situations.
From an efficiency standpoint, the pragmatic tendency to deny
compensation for pure economic losses does not raise serious concerns. The
socially relevant extent of a pure economic loss suffered by an individual
user of a public service or infrastructure is generally given by the difference
between the first and second best opportunity available to such individual.
The measure of lost profits from the sales in a closed market is not a good
proxy for the computation of the relevant social loss in such cases.
Compensation should not exceed the difference between the foregone profit
and the profit such individual could have made by engaging in the second
best productive activity. Furthermore, such measure only provides an upper
26 Victor Goldberg, Recovery For Economic Loss Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,

23 J. Legal Stud. 1, 37 (1994)
27 See, e.g., Weller v. Foot & Mouth Disease Research Inst., 1 QB 569 (1966); Louisiana
ex rel. Guste, v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985)
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limit in the amount of recoverable damages. Some of the lost profit for the
plaintiff, in fact, could well result in a windfall gain for other suppliers, who
might be able to draw a benefit from the larger share of demand that they
can serve. In a perfectly elastic market response, the accident would
occasion no socially relevant economic loss (i.e. the pure economic loss of
one party would be offset by the pure economic gain of others, with no net
social loss). With imperfect market elasticity, however, there could be
positive social loss. A private economic loss of one party would not
generate a social loss of equal magnitude, except in the purely abstract case
of a perfectly inelastic market (i.e., situation where the market cannot
compensate for the production shortage and thus satisfy the excess
demand). In most cases, the pure economic loss of the victims thus
constitutes a gross over-estimate of the true social loss, and the
exclusionary rule correctly avoids excessive liability and over-deterrence.
The dominant trend in European jurisdictions, denying recovery for
third parties’ pure economic loss, is therefore fully consistent with our
hypothesis that the practical contours of the economic loss rule are driven
by implicit efficiency considerations. The overall social relevance of the
economic losses for the various parties is likely to be at a minimum in this
group of cases. Most likely, the quasi-unanimous application of the
exclusionary rule in these situations reflects a combination of factors. First,
the economic loss is likely to be a “purely private economic loss.” Second,
even in those few instances of inelastic market conditions in which the
private loss of the parties might generate a social loss, the administrative
costs of implementing a full liability system would be prohibitive. The
occasional efficiency gains do not justify the creation of such large
administrative costs.
3.4.

Economic Loss and the Market for Professional Services and
Information

The fourth and last group of cases considers the liability of those
who furnish professional advice, prepare data or render services concerning
financial matters. The information or services that they furnish to a client
may be relied upon by third persons. If the advice, data or services are
carelessly compiled or executed, the relying third party may sustain a pure
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economic loss. Textbook examples of this category of economic loss
include the case of accountants who carelessly overstate the company’s net
financial worth causing investors, who rely on the accuracy of their audit, to
buy shares in the company at more than its current value. Other examples
contemplate the case of mistaken or false job reference and credit ratings,
which may cause financial losses to a third party. 28 Professional services of
lawyers may likewise occasion harm to a third party, such as in the case of
a will carelessly prepared by a lawyer for his client, which is subsequently
deemed invalid, with a pecuniary loss to a third party non-client. 29
The empirical findings from European jurisdictions concerning this
category of economic loss are quite peculiar. European courts are virtually
unanimous in allowing recovery of pure economic loss when the flawed
services are provided by lawyers and notaries, 30 but are more reluctant to
allow such recovery in the case of auditors and accountants. The
dichotomous approach followed by European courts is at first quite
puzzling. There no obvious features in the nature of the services provided
by lawyers and notaries that can help us differentiate them from the case of
auditors and accountants. A more careful consideration of the matter
through economic lenses, however, unveils the latent qualitative difference
between the two groups of cases.
Lawyers and notaries generally provide services that benefit
exclusively the client or restricted group of third parties. Any third party
that derives a benefit from the services of the notary or lawyer, such as to
be able to claim an economic loss if the services were flawed, is likely to be
an intended beneficiary of the client who is paying for the professional
service. The price of services rendered by this group of professionals
incorporates the expected cost of professional liability in the event of
involuntary malpractice. As part of the professional fees charged by the

28 See also, Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., AC 465 (HL) (1964)
29 See, e.g., White v. Jones, 2 AC 207 (HL) (1995); Lucas v. Hamm, 11 Cal. Rept. 727

(Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Ross v. Caunters [1980] Ch. 297
30 As discussed above, in the specific case of Notaries (e.g., the defective will drafted by a

negligent Notary), there is virtual unanimity in favor of the intended beneficiary’s recovery
of his or her financial loss: eleven European countries sampled in the Bussani & Palmer
(2001) study indicate the recoverability of the loss, with no system opposing such solution.
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lawyer or notary, the client is thus paying for the implicit warranty of
quality.
The same logic applies in the case of accountants and auditors. In
this case, however, there is a much larger range of individuals that may
utilize and rely upon the information provided by these professionals. If
liability were imposed for the pure economic loss suffered by all such third
parties, the larger potential cost of liability for malpractice would be borne
by those who acquire the professional services, under the form of higher
fees. This, in turn, would reduce the quantity of professional services
demanded, with a potential deadweight loss for society.
What distinguishes the two groups of cases is, therefore, the ability
of the “purchaser” of professional services (i.e., the client) to internalize the
full benefit of the information or services acquired. If third parties (other
than the intended beneficiaries of the professional service) can rely on the
information produced by the professional (and claim compensation in case
of flawed information), without directly or indirectly contributing to the
cost of the service, creating externality problem, which would lead to a suboptimal demand for professional services.
This analysis nicely squares with the dichotomous treatment of
professional services cases in European jurisdictions. Due to the intrinsic
nature of the services provided by accountants and auditors, it is more
likely that third party investors and other financial institutions may rely
upon the information they provide. Once the information is made available,
the original purchaser of the professional service is generally unable to
capture the full benefit generated by the information (e.g., collecting a
payment from third parties who take advantage of the information). Here,
the selective application of the exclusionary rule serves the very valuable
purpose of correcting the externality problem that would otherwise affect
the market for professional services.
In this last group of cases as well, therefore, the European trends are
consistent with the economic model of optimal liability, yet the
exclusionary rule reflects a slightly more complex set of considerations.
The rule prevents the recovery from third parties (other than intended
beneficiaries), since such parties would otherwise increase the cost of the
service at the expense of the buyer of the service, with a resulting
externality loss. This application of the exclusionary rule is consistent with
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the hypothesis that the practical contours of the economic loss rule are
driven by efficiency considerations, but is not immediately derived from out
economic restatement of the exclusionary rule.
We may conclude that plaintiffs are barred from recovering
damages, not because their losses are purely private, but because the
compensation for such economic losses would impose an external cost on
those who purchase professional services, with a resulting deadweight loss
for society. The application of the exclusionary rule in these cases, is
efficient, but represents a second-best outcome, compared to an ideal
alternative in which all third parties could be induced to contribute to the
cost of the information supplied by the professional, enjoying full
compensation in the event of flawed professional services.
3.5.

A Postscript on Intentional vs. Negligent Torts.

Intent is another feature of the economic loss rule with little
explanation in the traditional rationales of the rule. All European legal
systems agree intentionally inflicted pure economic loss is recoverable. The
exclusionary rule only applies to economic loss caused by negligent
behavior, not intentional wrongdoing.
The common treatment in European law of economic loss that arises
from intentional wrongdoing poses an interesting puzzle. In determining the
extent of liability, most European systems give little significance to the
subjective element of a tort, since negligent and intentional torts are
governed by common principles as far as damages are concerned. The
divergence in European systems, however, begins when negligence is found
to be the cause of the pure economic loss.
The recoverability of the intentionally inflicted economic loss has
two important economic explanations.
First, given the more difficult burden of proof, intentional torts
represent only a small fraction of the total number of tort claims. Only a
small fraction of tort cases are successfully decided as intentional torts. This
renders the compensation of intentionally inflicted pure economic loss less
problematic from the point of view of derivative and open-ended litigation.
Pure economic losses necessitate full compensation for a second,
more compelling reason. As we noted in Section 3, several situations that
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fall within the scope of the exclusionary rule occasion zero-sum transfers
from the victim to a third party. From a social welfare point of view, such
cases may impose a loss on an individual, but they do not create a net social
loss, because of the presence of offsetting benefits accruing to third parties.
In such cases, the optimal level of liability would require no liability
for pure economic loss, since no corresponding social loss is created. The
exclusionary rule, if applied, would create no inefficiency in terms of
incentives. This logic does not apply to intentional torts, where the
application of the exclusionary rule would create troubling results. It would,
in fact, be possible for an intentional tortfeasor to impose a pure economic
loss on a victim, creating a direct economic benefit for a third party,
without having to face any tortious liability. This would create the
opportunity for uncompensated “takings,” intentionally carried out for the
benefit of a third party to the detriment of another. From an economic point
of view, these zero-sum transfers would generate the potential for a
dangerous spiral of reciprocal takings with substantial rent dissipation for
society as a whole.
This helps to explain the presence of a common rule among all
European legal systems excluding the application of the economic loss rule
for the case of intentional torts. This further explains the flexibility used by
European courts in evaluating the “intention” element in this group of
cases. 31 For the practical purposes discussed above, the risk for reciprocal
takings to the benefit of third parties is not only the result of purposeful
planning but also the possible consequence of indirect intent (dolus
eventualis) which should be included within the notion of intentional
wrongdoing in the application of the economic loss rule. Though harder to
prove than negligence, the incidence of financial fraud is not a rare
occurrence and the most liberal interpretation of the notion of intent is
therefore explainable as a necessary effort to afford adequate protection.

31 See, e.g., C. von Bar, Liability for Information and Opinions Causing Pure Economic
Loss to Third Parties: A Comparison of English and German Case Law, in B. Markesinis,
The Gradual Convergence 104 (OUP 1994); P. Cendon, “Il dolo nella responsabilità
extracontrattuale” (Giappichelli 1976).
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4.

Conclusions

The efficiency criterion appears to provide a fitting rationalization
of what would otherwise remain puzzling empirical findings. European
legal systems that generally follow a different theoretical approach to tort
issues seem to react quite similarly to the various categories of pure
economic loss, with solutions that often depart from entrenched dogmatic
principles. The European trends in pure economic loss cases are virtually
inexplicable when combined with the traditional doctrines of pure
economic loss. The economic restatement of the exclusionary rule allows us
to return to the comparative findings confirming our hypothesis that the
efficiency criterion strongly influences the observed judicial solutions.
Behind the veil of rhetorical dogmatism, European Courts attempt to
implement an exclusionary rule that promotes efficient outcomes. European
courts are attentive to the needs of striking a practical balance between the
limiting litigation while maintaining effective deterrence, within the
dogmatic constraints imposed by their legal tradition. The analysis has
unveiled the sound economic logic of much European case law, dispelling
the fist impression of ad hoc judicial pragmatism.
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